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Regret Concept in Non-Cooperative Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–5
A.E. Bardin
Abstract
In this paper new concept of a solution for a non-cooperative game under un-
certainty is formalized. It is based on the next concepts: the vector-valued saddle
point (from the theory of the multicriteria problems under uncertainty ); the Nash
equilibrium situation (from the game theory ); the ”regret” function. In the theory
of the multicriteria problems under uncertainty the basic concept is the principle of
guaranteed result which is directed to the possibility of realization of the ”worse”
uncertainty. However we can use the other concepts of optimality which take into
account the possibility of realization of the favorable uncertainty.
The Problem of Avoidance for Controlled Dynamic Objects . . . . . . 7–20
A.A. Chikrii
Abstract
In this paper we make an attempt to survey the results in the theory of differen-
tial games concerning the problem of avoidance the terminal set starting from any
initial position on the half-infinite interval of time.
This paper is devoted to the conditions of solvability for the problem, in certain
sense dual to the global problem of pursuit. It appears reasonable to call it the global
problem of avoidance (escape). This problem is closely related to the collission
avoidance problem and its solvability means that from any initial position the game
can be terminated in favour of the evader that is all trajectories of the conflict
controlled process will be avoided the terminal set on the half-infinite interval of
time (the whole phase space appears as the domain of priority for the evader).
The paper involves results concerning the problem of escape both in the cases
of a single pursuer and a group of pursuers. The case of a group interaction is also
treated here. Despite a specific nature of this problem a number of examples falls
into its pattern.
The Regularized Shapley Value for a Bin Packing Game . . . . . . . . 21–26
E.V. Eguiazarova
Abstract
A following combinatorial game is considered: there are n objects of sizes
a1, . . . , an and m bins of sizes b1, . . . , bm, where we assume that each object i fits
into any bin j, i. e. ai ≤ bj for all i and all j.
The time consistency of Shapley value is investigated. For the cases of time
inconsistent Shapley value the ”regularization” of characteristic function (c. f.) —
V¯ (S) — is proposed. It is shown that the Shapley value defined for the regularized
c. f. is time consistent.
Search Problems on 1-skeletons of Regular Polyhedrons . . . . . . . . . 27–37
F.V. Fomin, P.A. Golovach and N.N. Petrov
Abstract
For pursuit-evasion games played on 1-skeletons of regular polyhedrons some
problems of finding the minimum number of pursuers needed for the capture (in
various senses) of the mobile invisible evader are considered. The results obtained
for these graphs are consequences of fundamental theorems in the theory of graph
searching developed by authors Fomin (1997), Golovach (1990), Petrov (1996).
Game-Theoretical Model of the Assembly
Line Balancing Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39–51
J. Kaluski
Abstract
In the paper we consider the assembly line balancing (ALB) problem, that rests
on grouping of assembly operations in admissible subsets, which form work places
at the assembly line. We present a game-theoretical model of the ALB problem
and the prospect of game-theoretical process description of multi-stage allocation
to work places. We show a game-theoretical approach to dynamical hierarchical
systems analysis and introduce an hierarchical model of ALB problem in the form
of dynamic n-person game with coalitions. We also solve an example of game-
theoretical representation of simple ALB problem without additional constraints.
Game Theoretic Model of the Board Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53–64
M. Kultina
Abstract
In current paper we present the problem of theoretical analysis of voting using
cyclic multistage game with complete information. We consider a problem of election
a board of the concern which consists of n independent companies. It is supposed
that each company may suggest the set of candidates to take part in the vote for
the board. And the problem statement is how the voters have to vote and what
the optimal membership in the board is. In the paper simultaneous n-person voting
game and algorithm of constructing the multistage voting game are formulated.
For simultaneous n-person case it was proved that for different minimal admissible
coalitions different Nash equilibrium can be received. For the cyclic multistage case
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is found and the Nash equilibrium strategies
are represented with the help of flow chart.
On the Consistency of Optimal Behavior in Extensive Games . . 65–76
D.V. Kuzutin, O.P. Osokina and I.A. Romanenko
Abstract
In this paper we present a reexamination of the strong time consistency concept
in n-person extensive game with perfect and imperfect information. As a result of
this reexamination we offer a refinement of this property, the concept of Dynamical
Compatibility, and examine the dynamical compatibility and time consistency of
such optimality principles as Nash equilibria, Pareto efficiency and their refinements.
We believe the dynamical compatibility is
• the desirable property of optimality principles
• an approach to the refinement of optimal sets.
Using this concept we offer new Nash equilibria refinement and prove the time
consistency of this optimality principle. In addition, we have shown that the well-
known sufficient conditions providing that the finite n-person extensive game with
complete information possesses a unique (in payoffs’ sense) subgame perfect equi-
librium are actually too strong. We offer new sufficient conditions and prove the
uniqueness theorem. Under the same conditions the corresponding game in normal
form has an iterated dominant strategy equilibrium and the unique optimal payoffs’
vector can be defined by using the backwards induction procedure. An investigation
of some subgame perfect equilibriums of special type in 2-person extensive games
with perfect information completes the paper.
Two Person Hi-Lo Poker – Stud and Draw,II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77–90
V.V. Mazalov and M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
In the paper two person Hi-Lo stud and draw poker are considered. The optimal
strategies are obtained. The asymptotic analysis of the strategies is given.
Agreeable Solutions in Differential Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91–103
L.A. Petrosjan
Abstract
Two-person non-zero-sum differential games are considered. The analysis is re-
stricted to Pareto payoffs that satisfy a (global) individual rationality condition
(admissible Pareto payoffs). This restriction does not guarantee that the individ-
ual rationality property will be satisfied at any intermediate time instant since
one player may gain by switching to a noncooperative strategy. The allocation
mechanism of the Pareto payoffs insuring time consistency is developed. Then, by
introducing a payoff distribution procedure, the author changes the way of pay-
ments along the Pareto optimal trajectory to achieve and guarantee an agreeable
solution. Regularized weak Pareto optimal trajectories are introduced to cope with
cases where nonnegative Pareto distribution payoffs are required.
Group Pursuit with Phase Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105–113
N.N. Petrov
Abstract
A class of conflict-controlled processes with additional (”phase” type) restrictions
on the state of the evader is considered. The boundary of the ”phase” restrictions
is not a ”deathline” for the evader. Sufficient conditions for the sollvability of the
pursuit and evasion problems are obtained, which complement a range of well-known
results.
Nash Equilibria in Differential Pursuit Game
with One Pursuer and m Evaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115–123
S.I. Tarashnina
Abstract
It was found out in the problems of group pursuit, in particular in the non zero-
sum game of simple pursuit with several evaders (each aiming his own interests) and
one pursuer, that there exists an infinite set of Nash equilibriums (L. A. Petrosjan,
V. D. Shirjaev [1986]). It turned out that the player P (the pursuer) is able to force
the evaders to behave in an extremely disadvantageous way by means of the threat
of changing the pursuit order. The different Nash equilibria with this property are
considered.
Equilibrium in Non–Cooperative Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125–145
K.S. Vaisman
Abstract
In the paper the non-cooperative n-players game under uncertainty is considered.
In the game noises, perturbations, errors of measurements and other kinds of arise
about which only the boundaries of their changes are known. The goal of player is
to choose his own strategy, taking into account any uncertainty such that his payoff
will be stable (in that or other playing sense). Here two approaches are used to
formalize solution concepts in the game under consideration. The first approach
represent the analog of saddle point for zerosum game. The second approach mod-
ifies the concept vectorvalued maximin. The paper presents several extensions of
the equilibrium concept, such as the definition of guaranteeing Bequilibrium is pro-
posed. The concepts of guaranteed Bequilibrium and UBSE are also developed for
the strictly convex games which are extracted from the class of the non-cooperative
n-players games. The algorithm of the construction the unimprovable Bequilibrium
by Slater (UBSE) for the strictly convex games is proposed.
Nash Equilibrious Routing in Ring Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147–159
N.S. Vasiliev
Abstract
Routings of different communicating pairs of subscribers depend one from an-
other. Thus, it is not obvious that all net subscribers can be satisfied simultaneously
and even if it is possible the problem is how to find the solution. Messaging increases
load and lengthens corresponding lines. It enlarges cross-network delay worsening
routings of those pairs who share the same lines. Routing of the whole network is
called to be equilibrious if every communicating pair sends messages along optimal
routes. The main result of this paper is that in ring networks there is a unique
equilibrious routing.
Set-Valued Analogues of the Prenucleolus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161–173
E. Yanovskaya
Abstract
A new solution concept called an extended prenucleolus is defined for TU games.
Characterizations of their solution in terms of balancedness as well as in terms of
Pareto optimality and the reduced-game property are given. The main theorem
gives an axiomatic characterization of the extended prenucleolus. It is shown further
that these axioms are independent.
An Isoperimetric Differential Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175–188
D.W.-K. Yeung
Abstract
This paper develops a differential game model of common-pool resource extrac-
tion. There no lease tenure which means that the game will end when all extractable
deposits are extracted. Hence we have an isoperimetric game problem. A FNE so-
lution of the game is derived. The firms’ value functions, a set of state-dependent
FNE strategies and the game equilibrium resource stock dynamics are provided. An
efficiency analysis is given.
Non-Cooperative Games under Uncertaintly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189–222
V.I. Zhukovskiy, V.S. Molostvov and K.S. Vaisman
Abstract
Perturbations, noises, errors of measurements and other kinds of uncertainties
are present in the real game problems. This paper reviews studies of non-cooperative
games under uncertainty. The concept of vector guarantee plays a main part in the
formalization of the game solution. Two approaches are considered: the analog
of vector saddle point and the analog of vector maximin. These two variants of
solution are applied in case of studying Nash equilibrium under uncertainty, Berge
equilibrium under uncertainty and equilibrium of threats and counterthreats under
uncertainty.
